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Abstract:   
Firms in many situations must make investment decisions long before they meet with 
new capital suppliers. In addition, most physical capital is specific to a task or location, 
thus implying potentially important switching costs in case negotiations between a firm 
and a supplier break down. The present paper analyzes the implications of these 
frictions. The sequentiality of investment makes it impossible to write binding ex-ante 
contracts. Together with the rents arising from switching costs, this implies a holdup 
problem. In partial equilibrium, firms react strategically by overinvesting so as to reduce 
their marginal productivity and thus the price of capital they negotiate with their suppliers 
upon matching. In general equilibrium, the holdup problem interacts with externalities 
from switching costs, resulting in inefficient allocations. In a more general 
macroeconomic context, the holdup problem in physical capital markets interacts with 
holdup problems in labor markets that typically lead to underinvestment. As long as 
capital and labor are complements, this presents the firm with a trade-off between 
overinvestment and overemployment that neutralizes, at least partially, the distortionary 
effects of each of the two holdup problems. 
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1 Introduction
Factor specicity and contract incompleteness are pervasive phenomena in economic transactions
and considered to be a major source of ine¢ ciency. Whenever one party expends resources that
increase the value of a productive relationship relative to its outside options (i.e. specicity) and
other participating parties can appropriate some of the quasi-rents arising from this investment
(i.e. contract incompleteness), a holdup problem occurs. In partial equilibrium, holdup problems
typically reduce the incentive to invest (e.g. Simons, 1944; or Grout, 1984). In general equilibrium,
markets react such as to alleviate holdup problems, resulting in underutilization of resources, missing
technology adoption, and excessive destruction (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1998a).
In this paper, I examine the consequences of holdup problems in physical capital markets and
show that the frictions usually associated with underinvestment specicity and contract incom-
pleteness can lead to exactly the opposite outcome: overinvestment. The result arises naturally
in an environment where rms need to make investment decisions before they can participate in
physical capital markets to nd new suppliers; and where trading frictions make it costly to switch
from one capital supplier to another. The rst assumption implies that rms cannot enter into ex-
ante contracts (explicit or implicit) with suppliers, simply because rms do not know their trading
partners at the time of the investment decision. The second assumption implies that once matched,
capital suppliers and rms enjoy quasi-rents. In conjunction with the inexistence of ex-ante con-
tracts, this implies a holdup problem. As long as di¤erent capital goods are substitutes, the rm has
a strategic incentive to accumulate ex-ante more capital than is socially optimal as this decreases the
marginal productivity of new capital and thus the price over which the rm negotiates ex-post with
its suppliers. In principle, capital suppliers would like to pursue exactly the inverse strategy. But
since capital accumulation is a sequential process involving many di¤erent capital suppliers, each
supplier takes the rms capital stock and consequently the price of capital as exogenous. Holdup
problems in physical capital markets thus lead to overinvestment. This result is important because
the policy implications of overinvestment (e.g. for optimal capital taxation) are radically di¤erent
than for underinvestment, which is the result typically emphasized by the holdup literature.
The overinvestment result crucially hinges on the presence of ex-ante investment decisions by
rms and switching costs in physical capital markets. Neither of these assumptions seems very
2
restrictive. Capital accumulation is an inherently sequential process, which means that a large
fraction of the rms capital stock is predetermined when the rm meets with new capital suppliers.
Furthermore, rms often need to plan for new ventures and secure nancing long before they look for
suppliers. Switching costs, in turn, are a natural implication of the fact that most physical capital
is specic to a particular task and/or location. Classical time-to-build and adjustment cost models
of investment implicitly build on the same assumption, but keep the price of capital determined
competitively. By contrast, the present paper posits that specicity gives rise to trading frictions
that render physical capital markets decentralized and leave prices open to bilateral bargaining.
After a review of the existing literature on holdup problems in Section 2, Section 3 derives the
overinvestment result in a basic model with homogenous capital as the only factor of production.
To make the concept of specicity and trading frictions explicit, I assume as in Kurmann and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) that the allocation of capital from suppliers to rms is subject to random
matching.1 Once matched, capital suppliers bargain with their respective rm over the price of
capital. Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), I assume that at any time before production starts,
a capital supplier may enter into pairwise renegotiation with its rm. Likewise, a rm may call in
any supplier for renegotiation. Within each pairwise negotiation, the rm and the supplier play
an alternating-o¤er game with exogenous probability of breakdown as in Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1986). The bargaining protocol implies a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium price that
is identical for all suppliers and solves the generalized Nash bargaining problem over the match
surplus.2 This solution depends on the rms infra-marginal productivities of capital because the
rm realizes that if negotiations with any supplier break down, the price with all other matched
suppliers is renegotiated so as to reect the change in the rms productivity. Furthermore, since
capital is a durable factor of production, the e¤ect of a larger capital stock today a¤ects the rms
bargaining position with capital suppliers in future periods. As long as capital goods are substitutes,
the rm thus has an incentive to overinvest relative to the socially optimal level because doing so
drives down the productivity of new capital and, in turn, the negotiated price.
1The formalization of trading frictions with random matching is closely related to the now widely used search
and a matching approach for the labor market (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), and is similar in spirit to the
modelization of trading frictions for nancial assets (e.g. Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen,
2005; Lagos and Rocheteau, 2008b).
2As Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) show, the non-cooperative solution implied by their pairwise bargaining protocol
is equivalent to the Shapley values of a corresponding cooperative game. This provides an appealing economic
reinterpration of the bargaining protocol.
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The random matching model to formalize ex-post specicity is appealing because it implies a
tractable analytical solution and represents a minimal departure from the neoclassical benchmark.
Furthermore, Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) and Gavazza (2008) show that random match-
ing captures di¤erent empirical regularities about the allocation and reallocation of physical capital.
At the same time, the model embodies a number of important assumptions and it is legitimate to
ask to what extent the overinvestment result is robust to alternative environments. Section 4 ad-
dresses this concern. First, I show that the overinvestment result emerges independently of the
matching friction as long as one maintains that specicity prevents rms from costlessely replacing
a capital supplier with another. At the same time, matching frictions play an important role in gen-
eral equilibrium because rms and suppliers do not take into account the e¤ect of their investment
decision on match probabilities. Together with the holdup problem, this externality implies that
the decentralized allocation is always ine¢ cient; and, depending on the severity of the externality,
may even cause investment in general equilibrium to fall below the e¢ cient level. This underscores
the importance of working with a microfounded model of specicity when assessing the welfare
implications of holdup problems.
Second, I alter the characteristics of the capital suppliers. Following the neoclassical benchmark,
capital suppliers are modeled as atomistic agents who each produce a homogenous, perfectly divisible
capital good prior to entering the market. In reality, capital suppliers are often large entities
who produce heterogenous capital goods and negotiate with rms simultaneously over price and
quantity. I show that the overinvestment result survives in such an alternative environment as
long as one maintains sequentiality of the rms investment decisions and substitutability across
capital goods. Sequentiality ensures that the rm cannot enter into ex-ante contracts with future
suppliers. Substitutability, in turn, implies that investment in a given capital good lowers the
marginal productivity of other capital goods. As in the basic model, the rm therefore has a
strategic motive to overinvest in capital because a larger capital stock today improves the rms
bargaining position with future suppliers.
Section 5 assesses how holdup problems in physical capital markets interact with specicity and
contracting problems in the labor market. To this end, I incorporate the capital matching environ-
ment in a general equilibrium macroeconomic framework with labor market matching frictions and
ex-post bargaining along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The resulting decentralized
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economy is characterized by a double holdup problem. As before, holdups in physical capital mar-
kets provide the rm with an incentive to overinvest. But now, rms also face a holdup problem in
the labor market that provides them with an incentive to overhire so as to lower labor productivity
and thus the negotiated wage. This overhiring result is exactly the case emphasized by Stole and
Zwiebel (1996a,b) and Smith (1999), and extended more recently by Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer
(2007). Under the assumption that capital and labor are substitutes in production, the two holdup
problems lead to both overinvestment and overhiring, thus o¤ering a cautionary tale that holdup
problems in the labor market do not necessarily lead to underinvestment, as is typically emphasized
in the literature (e.g. Grout, 1984; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). If, instead, capital and labor are
complements, the two holdup problems partly neutralize each other and present the rm with a
trade-o¤. Overinvestment reduces the holdup problem in the capital market but exacerbates the
holdup problem in the labor market. Vice versa, overhiring alleviates the holdup problem on the
labor side but worsens the holdup problem on the capital side. Which side of this trade-o¤ prevails
depends on the specics of technology and the relative bargaining powers of capital suppliers and
workers. The two holdup problems thus neutralize each other at least partially and imply that the
decentralized economy may be relatively close to e¢ ciency even if each holdup problem on its own
severely distorts allocations.
Section 6 concludes by discussing the importance of the overinvestment result for optimal policy,
and why overinvestment may o¤er interesting explanations for a number of empirical observations.
2 Related literature
The overinvestment result contrasts with much of the existing literature on holdup problems even
though the underlying causes  factor specicity and incomplete contracts are the same. The
di¤erence in results is due to small but important alternative assumptions about the microstruc-
ture behind specicity and contract incompleteness. In classic studies on holdup problems, it is
assumed that while agents can negotiate in competitive markets prior to making investment deci-
sions, institutions are insu¢ cient to prevent ex-post renegotiation. In response, a large literature
has emerged that analyzes under what conditions alternative arrangements help circumvent holdup
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problems even in the presence of incomplete contracts.3 In the present environment, the sequential
nature of investment decisions prevents rms and capital suppliers from entering into contact with
each other at the time the rm needs to sink resources. Hence, there is simply no counterparty
with which to conclude a contract or any other related arrangement. This sequential assumption
of invest-and-meetis similar to descriptions of the labor markets where rms rst have to invest
before hiring workers, and workers rst need to conclude their education before nding jobs.4 As
Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) show, the only way in which holdup problems are prevented in such
a situation is if either party can commit ex-ante to a price and the other party can direct their
search towards the agent that o¤ers the best trade-o¤ between price and match probability. As I
show in Section 4, the same price posting / directed search assumption resolves the holdup problem
in the present context and results in an e¢ cient allocation. It remains an open question, however,
what type of institutions or mechanisms prevent rms from reneging ex-post on their posted prices
especially in a world with highly specialized capital projects that need to be frequently adjusted
to changing situations.5
The overinvestment result also contrasts with Caballero and Hammour (1998a) who analyze
an environment that looks very similar in the sense that the value of factors is higher in joint
production than in autarky. Yet, Caballero and Hammour nd that contract incompleteness in
their model leads to underinvestment. Two assumptions explain this di¤erence. First, Caballero
and Hammour impose that the productivity in joint relationships is exogenous and thus, the concept
of the rm as an independent optimizing entity is absent. In other words, their model assumes away
any role for decreasing marginal returns (or more generally, substitutability across capital goods) to
a¤ect the bargaining set and thus the negotiated price of capital. Second, Caballero and Hammour
3Prominent examples include the ex-ante reallocation of property rights and vertical integration (e.g. Williamson,
1975; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1990); punishment schemes
(MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993); or long-term relations (Williamson, 1975). See Holmstrom and Roberts (1998)
and Caballero (2007) for reviews.
4The assumption of investment in capital goods and projects prior to trading is also similar in spirit to the analysis
of innovation and venture capital cycles by Silveira and Wright (2005, 2006).
5More generally, Caballero (2007, page 64) argues that "...specic investments are typically made not once and for
all, but incrementally throughout the life of a production unit. [In ideal contracts], the plan for making such invest-
ments, the duration of the relationship, the rent-division mechanism, and the multiple dimensions that characterize
each factors participation, must be pre-specied from the start and made fully contingent on the future protability
of the production unit, on factors that determine its evolving prospects, and on the various events, both aggregate
and idiosyncratic, that govern each factors outside opportunity costs. A variety of problems of observability, ver-
iability, enforceability, and sheer complexity, make such ideal contracts rarely feasible. Thus, agents enter into
arrangements...that leave plenty of room for ex post discretion."
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assume that factor suppliers have a convex cost structure and "...that each type of factor in the
production unit forms a coalition that bargains as a single agent" (fn. 13, p. 733). Their analysis
thus puts all the power to alleviate the holdup problem in the hands of the suppliers. In the
present framework, by contrast, rms exploit substitutability across capital goods to attenuate the
holdup problem. Suppliers, in turn, operate in a decentralized market where they match with rms
that carry over a large part of their capital stock from previous periods. Perfect coalitions among
suppliers in such a setting seems all but impossible since this would imply that all suppliers over the
entire history of a rms capital accumulation collaborate ex-ante (i.e. before they even know each
other) over the bargaining strategy.6 One interpretation of this di¤erence in assumptions is that
Caballero and Hammours environment is one about holdup problems for rm entry whereas the
present environment is about holdup problems in the allocation of capital to existing rms (which,
empirically, hold the majority of physical capital). This comparison highlights the crucial role of
microeconomic structure for the analysis of holdup problems, and one of the main contribution of
the paper is to show that two relatively innocuous assumptions substitutability im production
and absence of perfect coalitions among capital suppliers  overturn Caballero and Hammours
underinvestment result.
Finally, the overinvestment result contrasts with studies by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) or
Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2006) where although for very di¤erent reasons holdup problems
imply underinvestment despite the fact that suppliers do not collude and capital is subject to
diminishing returns. The main reason for this di¤erence is that capital allocation in these studies
is frictionless.7 Instead, holdup problems occur because rms need to hire labor (respectively
sell goods) in frictional markets that are characterized by incomplete contracts. Firms in such
a situation want to underinvest because this lowers labor productivity (respectively increases the
marginal cost of production), thus a¤ecting the bargaining set over which they negotiate ex-post
the wage (the price) with the worker (the consumer). The point of the paper is not to question
the mechanism behind underinvestment that these studies emphasize. Rather, the objective of the
paper is to analyze how trading frictions in physical capital markets by themselves can lead to
6As I show in Section 4, coalition of suppliers within a given period does not negate the overinvestment result
because rms still have a strategic motive for investment across periods.
7More precisely, capital in these papers is specic only in the sense that investment needs to take place prior to
production. The price of capital, however, is determined competitively and thus, there is no holdup problem in the
market for physical capital.
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overinvestment. In this sense, the paper is closely related to the analysis of intra-rm bargaining
in labor markets by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). Holdup problems in their environment arise
because of specicity in rm-worker relationships and the absence of ex-ante binding contracts.8
Multi-worker rms can react strategically to this holdup problem by increasing employment as this
drives down the marginal productivity of labor and thus the bargained wage rate. Without hiring
costs, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) show that rms overhire to drive wages all the way down to the
workers reservation wage. Smith (1999) and more recently Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2007)
incorporate this mechanism into a modern matching framework and show that in this case, hiring
costs prevent rms from completely eliminate the holdup problem. Furthermore, these papers
show that Stole and Zwiebels overhiring result does not necessarily survive in general equilibrium
because of the additional distortions associated with matching. In the present paper, the same
result obtains: externalities related to trading frictions may outweigh the overinvestment incentive
from the holdup probem and lead to ine¢ ciently low capital accumulation.
3 Overinvestment in a basic model
The basic model is intentionally kept simple to convey the main intuition. Physical capital is the
only factor of production and the opportunity cost of capital supply is exogenous. A more general
model with labor as a second factor of production and an endogenous consumption-capital supply
margin is analyzed in Section 5.
3.1 Environment
The basic model is populated by a continuum of capital suppliers and a continuum of rms. All
agents live forever in discrete time and do not discount the future. There is some general consump-
tion good from which both capital suppliers and rms derive linear utility. Capital suppliers are
atomistic. Each one of them can transform consumption goods into new capital goods by means
8Note that there is a subtle but important di¤erence in contract incompleteness between the present case and the
one in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b), Smith (1999) and Cahuc et al. (2007). In their papers, overhiring is derived under
the assumption that all labor contracts are renegotiated every period and that there is no mechanism to commit to
future wage and employment decisions (i.e. employment relationships are at-will). In the present paper, capital
is purchased and thus, renegotiation in the future is not an issue. Instead, contract incompleteness arises naturally
because of the sequentiality of investment decisions.
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of a linear technology. Firms produce consumption goods with productive capital stock k using
strictly increasing and concave technology f(k) that satises the usual Inada conditions.
The allocation of physical capital from suppliers to rms is subject to matching frictions along
the lines of Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) and occurs in two phases. In the rst phase,
rms open venturesat ow cost  and search for new capital. Capital suppliers, in turn, enter the
market with new (i.e. liquid) capital and search for rms with open ventures. Let v denote the
total number of new ventures by all rms in the current period, and l the total number of liquid units
of capital available. Then, if suppliers do not direct their capital towards any particular (group of)
rms,  = vl describes the capital market tightness, and total capital additions are governed by some
matching process m(v; l_)  min(v; l), with lim!0 @m(v; l)=@v = 1 and lim!1 @m(v; l)=@v = 0.
Accordingly, each venture matches with a unit of new capital with probability p() = m(v; l)=v,
and each unit of new capital matches with a venture with probability q() = m(v; l)=l. Firms and
capital suppliers take capital market tightness and thus the matching probabilities as exogenous.
Following most of the random matching literature, m(; _) is assumed constant returns to scale and
thus, p() = q(). For the subsequent analysis, it will also be useful to dene the elasticity of
matching with respect to liquid capital as @m(v;
l)
@l
l
m(v;l)
= ml
q()
= (), and the elasticity of matching
with respect to projects as @m(v;
l)
@v
v
m(v;l)
= mv
p()
= 1  ().9
In the second phase, ventures with matched capital become productive and, together with the
existing capital stock, yield output. After production has taken place, some exogenous fraction  of
the rms capital stock disappears due to depreciation. Unmatched capital, in turn, remains idle for
the period and then returns to the capital suppliers for consumption, net of some fraction (1  ).10
9To provide a specic example of matching in physical capital market that exhibits constant-returns-to-scale and
satises the boundedness conditions, consider a formulation that has been used previously by Den Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000) for the labor market. For the present context, this matching function takes the form
m(v; l) =
vl
(l + v)1=
with  > 1. The denominator J  (l + v)1= denotes the number of submarkets in which the capital market is
segmented. Available capital l and new ventures v are assigned randomly to one of the submarkets. Once assigned,
technological and spatial constraints prevent l and v from moving to another submarket. These constraints are
the source of market segmentation and, together with the random assignment assumption (due, for example, to
information imperfections about potential suppliers and rms), give rise to the matching friction. A match occurs
when a capital supplier and a venture are in the same submarket. The other ventures and capital suppliers remain
unmatched. Under these assumptions, the probability of a capital supplier to match with a venture is l=J , the
probability of a venture to match with available capital is v=J , and the total number of matches is vl=J .
10The presence of this deadweight loss is not essential for the results, except that in the present simple model with
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Given these assumptions, the evolution of the productive capital stock of a rm is described by
k+1 = (1  )k + p()v, (1)
where v denotes the number of new ventures per rm. Likewise, the evolution of idle capital is
u+1 = (1  q())l, (2)
where l denotes the number of capital units available for matching per rm; and u denotes the
number of idle capital units per rm.
3.2 E¢ cient allocation
An allocation in this environment is (constrained) e¢ cient if it maximizes the discounted sum of
total consumption goods subject to the technological constraint and the capital allocation friction.
Consider thus a hypothetical social planner who solves the following problem
O(k; u) = max
l;v
[f(k) + u  v   l +O(k+1; u+1)]
subject to
k+1 = (1  )k +m(v; l)
u+1 = l  m(v; l).
Since the social planner takes into account externalities from the matching friction and all rms are
identical, the problem is directly formulated in terms of aggregates l = l, v = v, k = k.11
The analysis focuses exclusively on steady state equilibria, where x = x+1 for all involved
variables. Appendix A provides an explicit derivation of the social planners problem. Here, I
simply focus on the characterization of the resulting equilibrium and provide some intuition.
linear utility and no discounting, it introduces an opportunity cost for the capital supplier such that the equilibrium
is well-dened.
11I assume that rms are large enough such that the expected number of matches equals the realized number of
matches. I thus abstract from any size and aggregation issues. In the full model in Section 5, aggregation and rm
size are unimportant because production is constant returns to scale in capital and labor.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique e¢ cient equilibrium, characterized by the solution (kS; S)
to the following optimality conditions
 = mv

f 0(k)

  

(3)
1   = ml

f 0(k)

  

(4)
PROOF: Appendix A.
Equation (3) says that the cost of an additional venture equals the marginal increase in matches
with respect to ventures times the marginal net surplus of an additional match. Equation (4),
in turn, says that the opportunity cost of converting a unit of consumption into additional liquid
capital equals the marginal increase in matches with respect to liquid capital times the net surplus
of an additional match. Combining the two equations to eliminate the marginal net surplus, and
recognizing that mv = (1   ())p() and ml = ()q() = ()p(), yields the following solution
for the socially e¢ cient capital market tightness12
S =
1  

1  ()
()
2 [0;1]. (5)
Given S, either (3) or (4) then pins down the socially e¢ cient capital stock kS. This equilibrium
is depicted by the dark blue lines in Figure 1.
12As Arseneau, Chugh and Kurmann (2008) show, this condition describes the equivalence of intertemporal margins
of transformation and substitution that, similar to the frictionless neoclassical benchmark, ensures e¢ ciency.
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Figure 1: E¢ cient and decentralized equilibrium in the basic model
3.3 Decentralized equilibrium with ex-post bargaining
In the decentralized economy, rms purchase capital from their matched suppliers. By assumption
of the matching friction, rms cannot contract on the price of capital ex-ante because they rst need
to open ventures before they enter the market to nd capital suppliers. Following Stole and Zwiebel
(1996a), I assume that once matched, suppliers and rms can reenter into pairwise renegotiation
of the price at any time before production starts. Moreover, within each pairwise negotiation, the
rm and the supplier play an alternating-o¤er game with exogenous probability of breakdown as
in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). As Stole and Zwiebel show, this bargaining protocol
implies a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium price that is identical for all suppliers, with the price
solving the generalized Nash bargaining problem over the match surplus.13,14 This solution depends
on the rms and the capital suppliers relative bargaining power as well as the value of their
respective outside options. For the capital suppliers, the outside option is to have an unmatched
unit of capital that is returned to them in the following period net of loss 1  . For the rm, the
13Wolinsky (2000) conrms the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic context. Also,
all of the following results would be robust to an alternative sharing rule over the gross surplus proposed by Shaked
and Sutton (1984). See Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, Appendix B) for details.
14The assumption of pairwise renegotiation implies that suppliers do not cooperate with each other in the nego-
tiation with the rm. While this assumption may seem strong, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) demonstrate that their
solution is equivalent to the Shapley values of a corresponding cooperative game. This equivalence is appealing as it
implies Shapley values for any ordering of suppliers and not just the expectation over a randomized order.
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outside option is to produce with one unit less of capital, which a¤ects its marginal productivity.
Hence, in the eyes of the rm, the rental rate is a function of its capital stock and thus expressed
as  = (k).
Consider a capital supplier that enters the capital market by transforming a unit of consumption
good into a unit of new capital good. The value of this entry decision is given by (ignoring time
subscripts)
We =  1 + q()Wk + (1  q())Wu, (6)
where Wk and Wu denote the value of a matched and unmatched unit of capital next period,
respectively. The former is dened by Wk = ; and the latter by Wu = . In optimum, there is free
entry; i.e. capital suppliers nd it optimal to provide a unit of new capital until We = 0.
Now, consider a rm that enters the period with capital stock k, of which k  (1 )k 1 is newly
matched, and needs to decide on how many new ventures v to undertake. Its problem is described
by
J(k; k 1) = max
v
[f(k)  (k)[k   (1  )k 1]  v + J(k+1; k)]
s:t: k+1 = (1  )k + p()v.
The rst-order condition is
 = p()
@J
@k+1
. (7)
The marginal value of an additional unit of capital is given by the envelope condition
@J
@k
= f 0(k)  0(k)[k   (1  )k 1]  (k) + (k+1)(1  ) + (1  ) @J
@k+1
. (8)
As discussed above, the rm takes into account that its outside option and thus the price of capital
it negotiates with its new suppliers is a¤ected by the capital stock. This strategic consideration is
embodied in the term 0(k)[k   (1  )k 1].
The decentralized economy is closed with Stole and Zwiebels (1996a) bargaining protocol. The
renegotiation proof price that emerges is the solution to the generalized Nash bargaining problem
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over the match surplus Jk +Wk  Wu. This price solves

@J
@k+1
= (1  )(Wk  Wu), (9)
where  denotes the bargaining power of the capital supplier.
To analyze the rms strategic investment behavior, I combine equations (7) and (8) and apply
the steady state condition k+1 = k = k 1 to obtain, after some rearrangement, an expression for
the rms demand for productive capital
(k) =
f 0(k)  0(k)k

  
p()
. (10)
Without the 0(k)k term, this equation would simply be a break-even condition, saying that the
price of capital equals the rms present value of an additional unit of capital minus the average
investment cost. With the 0(k)k term, the decision becomes more involved. The rm realizes that
adding capital a¤ects the price for all new capital, now and in the future. To describe the impact
of this addition, consider the Nash bargaining solution in (9). It implies the following expression
for the price of capital (see Appendix A for details)
(k) = 

f 0(k)  0(k)k


+ (1  ).
The price is a weighted average of the maximum price [f 0(k)   0(k)k]= that the rm is will-
ing to pay once matched, and the capital suppliers outside option , which equals the value of
an unmatched unit of capital in case negotiations break down. This is a non-homogenous linear
di¤erential equation of  in k with solution
(k) = k 
1

Z k
(1 )k
z
1 

f 0(z)

dz + (1  ). (11)
The rms maximum price is a weighted average of the marginal contribution of each unit of
investment to the rms present value. Intuitively, this dependence on infra-marginal productivities
occurs because the rm realizes that in case of a negotiation breakdown with one of its capital
suppliers, the rms productivity changes from f 0(k) to f 0(k ) and thus, the price with all other
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suppliers can be renegotiated based on the new marginal productivity f 0(k ) an argument that
can be carried through all the way to the rst unit of investment, in which case the rms capital
stock is (1   )k. Of course, this consideration of infra-marginal productivities is relevant only
because rms cannot costlessely replace a capital supplier with another in case negotiations break
down. It is this assumption of capital specicity that provides the scope for strategic investment
behavior.
Given the solution for the price of capital, the capital demand equation in (10) can be rewritten
as
(k) = OI  f
0(k)

  
p()
, (12)
with OI  1 
h
k 
1

R k
(1 )k z
1
f 00(z)dz
i
=f 0(k) denoting the overinvestment factor. If f 00() = 0 for
the range [(1   )k; k], marginal productivity f 0() is una¤ected by the rms investment behavior
and thus, the overinvestment factor equals OI = 1. If marginal productivity is decreasing over
some segment of [(1  )k; k], however, then OI > 1. In this case, the rm nds it optimal to drive
down productivity and thus the price of capital by increasing k beyond what is warranted by the
productivity of the marginal capital unit. Proposition 2 sums up this result.
Proposition 2. For f 00()  0 with strict inequality over some segment of [(1 )k; k], the rm
overinvests relative to the social planner in order to reduce the price of capital.
PROOF: Appendix A.
The overinvestment result can be nicely illustrated when technology takes the form f(k) = ka.
Then, equation (12) becomes
(k) =
1  (1  )(1  ) 1 (1 )
1  (1  )
k 1

  
p()
.
The term k
 1

denotes the rms present value of a marginal addition to its capital stock; and
the overinvestment factor equals OI = [1   (1   )(1   ) 1 (1 ) ]=[1   (1   )]. For  = 1
(i.e. f 00() = 0), marginal productivity is constant and there is no overinvestment. For  < 1,
the rms productivity depends on its capital stock and there is overinvestment as long as  > 0;
i.e. OI > 1. This overinvestment term increases with  as higher bargaining power for the capital
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suppliers increases the rms incentive to overinvest because the capital supplier obtains a larger
part of the match surplus.
Proposition 2 is a partial equilibrium result for a given level of  and (k). To examine the
e¤ects of overinvestment in general equilibrium, I combine the rms capital demand in (10) with
the price of capital in (11) to obtain
 = p()(1  )

OI  f
0(k)

  

. (13)
This equation implies that in equilibrium, the rms cost per venture equals its share of the match
surplus times the probability of a match. Likewise, the capital suppliers condition (6) and the
free-entry condition We = 0 can be combined with the rental rate equation to obtain
1   = q()

OI  f
0(k)

  

. (14)
This equation implies that in equilibrium, the capital suppliers opportunity cost of a unit of capital
equals its share of the match surplus times the probability of a match. The two equations lead to
the following characterization of the decentralized Nash bargaining equilibrium.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique decentralized bargaining equilibrium dened by (kB; B) that
solves (13) and (14). This equilibrium is always ine¢ cient. In particular,
- if  = (S), then B = S and kB > kS;
- if 0 <  < (S), then B > S and either kB > kSor kB < kS;
- if (S) <   1, then B < S and either kB > kS or kB < kS.
PROOF: Appendix A.
To provide some intuition for this proposition, combine (13) and (14) to eliminate the bracketed
expression. This yields a unique solution for capital market tightness
B =
1  

1  

2 [0;1]. (15)
Given B, either (13) or (14) then pins down the decentralized steady state capital stock kB. The
light red lines in the above Figure 1 illustrate this equilibrium.
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The decentralized solution for B in (15) closely resembles the socially e¢ cient solution in (5),
with the di¤erence that the bargaining power  replaces the matching elasticity (). If  = (),
then p()(1   ) = mv and q() = ml, in which case the bargaining power is just strong enough
that the rm and the capital suppliers matching probabilities reect the externality from adding
another venture, respectively another unit of liquid capital. This is the equivalent of Hosios(1990)
famous e¢ ciency condition in search models of the labor market with bargaining. Comparing (13)
and (14) with the social planner counterparts in (3) and (4), it is easy to see that the decentralized
allocation is e¢ cient if and only if OI = 1; i.e. if f 00() = 0 and thus, there is no overinvestment.
Assuming instead that f 00() < 0 over at least some segment [(1   )k; k] (an assumption that is
necessary for k to be well-dened), OI > 1 which implies that kB > kS as long as  is su¢ ciently
close to (). As  drops below (), suppliers get increasingly discouraged from entering. Likewise,
as  increases above (), rms become increasingly discouraged from posting ventures. At some
point, the negative e¤ect on the capital stock overwhelms the positive e¤ects from the holdup
problem and equilibrium capital drops below the socially e¢ cient level.
4 Behind overinvestment
The overinvestment result hinges on the absence of ex-ante binding contracts and the presence of
match specicity. This section illustrates the role of these two determinants by working through
di¤erent alternatives. First, I analyze the models prediction in a world with complete ex-ante
contracts. Second, I show that while explicit trading frictions have important general equilibrium
implications, they are not crucial for the overinvestment result as long as one maintains the as-
sumption of specicity. Third, I discuss the robustness of the overinvestment result with respect to
a number of changes to production and the characteristics of capital suppliers.
4.1 The role of contract incompleteness
In the basic model, capital suppliers and rms cannot draw up ex-ante contracts because they do not
know their trading partner at the time of investment. Here, I consider an alternative environment
where, for unspecied reasons, rms are able to commit to price of capital before matching with
their suppliers. Capital suppliers, in turn, observe the posted prices and direct their search towards
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the rm with the most favorable trade-o¤between match probability and price. All the other details
of the model remain the same. This price posting assumption is similar to the ones proposed in
Shimer (1996), Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for the labor market.15
To formalize the new environment, each rm is interpreted as a submarket for capital, denoted
by j. Upon observing the di¤erent price postings j, capital suppliers decide in which submarket
they want to send their unit of new capital. Firms that post a higher price will attract more capital
suppliers; i.e. capital market tightness j = vj=lj in submarket j is decreasing in j, where vj is the
number of new ventures by rm j and lj is the number of capital suppliers that decided to send
their capital to that rm. Capital suppliers thus face a trade-o¤ between a higher price if matched
and a lower probability of matching q(j). Vice versa, rms realize that a higher price posting will
attract more capital suppliers, thus increasing their matching probability p(j).
Since rms are identical, they all make the same optimal decisions in equilibrium. I thus omit
subscripts in the interest of simplication and, as before, work directly with a representative rm.
Consider rst the capital suppliers situation. Its optimal entry decision is identical to the one
described in (6), only that now, there is such a condition for each submarket j. Combining these
equations with the free-entry condition and the values of matched and unmatched capital, I obtain
1   = q()(  ). (16)
This equation denes market tightness as a function of the price, i.e.  = (), and describes
how capital supply reacts to di¤erent prices. The rms problem, in turn, consists of deciding
simultaneously on the number of new ventures and the posted price that attracts the optimal
amount of capital suppliers; i.e.
J(k; k 1) = max
v;
[f(k)  [k   (1  )k 1]  v + J(k+1; k)]
subject to the capital accumulation constraint k+1 = (1   )k + p()v, and the optimal capital
supply relation in (16). Note that in this formulation, the price  no longer depends on k in the
eyes of the rm, because  is now a choice variable.
15As Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show, the directing agent does not need to observe all price postings. Instead,
Bertrand competition ensures that all results obtain even if the directing agent observes only two random postings.
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An equilibrium in this environment must satisfy the following conditions: (i) entering capital
suppliers earn zero prots; (ii) capital suppliers direct search towards the rm with the highest
expected payo¤; (iii) rms are prot maximizing; and (iv) the equilibrium is consistent with rational
expectation; i.e. prices and probabilities are such that capital suppliers are indi¤erent about where
to direct capital. In other words, if a rm posted another price, the trade-o¤ between queue length
and price would be such that capital suppliers would not want to apply. Under these conditions,
the following proposition obtains.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique decentralized price posting equilibrium that coincides with
the e¢ cient allocation (S, kS).
PROOF: Appendix B.
This proposition is reminiscent of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and illustrates that one of
the root causes of ine¢ ciency in the decentralized economy is the absence of non-binding ex-ante
contracts. Instead, if rms can commit ex-ante to a posted price, then they internalize both the
externality of the matching friction and the holdup problem. As discussed in the literature review,
however, it remains an open question to what extent mechanisms and institutions in physical capital
markets exist that prevent renegotiation of ex-ante prices.
4.2 The (un)importance of explicit trading frictions
The main assumption of the paper is that the specicity inherent in most physical capital gives rise
to trading frictions that render physical capital markets decentralized. It is important to emphasize,
however, that holdups and overinvestment in partial equilibrium emerge independently of the exact
form of the trading friction. To illustrate this point, I consider the limiting case without random
matching frictions; i.e. there are no venture costs (i.e.  = 0), rms thus open an innity of
projects (i.e.  = 1) and all liquid capital is matched (i.e. q() = 1). As in Stole and Zwiebel
(1996a,b), however, I maintain ex-post specicity; i.e. markets remain decentralized such that rms
cannot replace one capital supplier with another in case negotiations break down. The following
proposition summarizes the implications of this special case.
Proposition 5. Given f 00()  0 with strict inequality over some segment of [(1 )k; k] and positive
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bargaining power by workers (i.e.  > 0), the rm overinvests (kB > kS) and the decentralized
equilibrium remains ine¢ cient.
PROOF: Appendix B.
To shed more light on this proposition, note that for  = 0, the social planner solution collapses
to
1 = f 0(k) + (1  ). (17)
Without matching frictions, e¢ cient capital accumulation is governed by the familiar Euler condi-
tion of the neoclassical benchmark (given zero discounting) that equates the intertemporal marginal
rate of transformation with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The decentralized equi-
librium, in turn, reduces to
 = 1 (18)
1 = OI  f 0(k) + 1  . (19)
Equation (18) is implied by the capital suppliersfree entry condition: since the matching is fric-
tionless and there is no discounting, the price of capital equals its opportunity cost, which is one.
Equation (19), in turn, is derived from the rms capital demand.16 Because of ex-post specicity,
rms still have the incenctive to overaccumulate capital so as to drive down the price of capital,
i.e. OI > 1, and the economy remains ine¢ cient. The main result of the paper is therefore robust
to whether ex-post specicity is modeled explicitly (e.g. through a matching friction) or assumed
implicitly as in Stole and Zwiebel. Only if one departs from the assumption of specicity altogether
and assumes competitive capital markets instead do holdups disappear. In this case, the market for
physical capital e¤ectively becomes competitive because rms can immediately replace one supplier
with another.
The explicit formulation of trading frictions as the source of specicity is useful, nevertheless.
First and as discussed above, trading frictions turn out to be crucial for e¢ ciency in general equi-
16Note that for general , this solution is consistent with the bargaining solution for the price only if  = 1. This
should not be surprising. When matching is frictionless and suppliers do not discount time, the reservation value of
a unit of unmatched capital must necessarily be 1. For  < 1, the bargaining solution becomes an inequality because
the capital supply condition  = 1 implies that the rm cannot accumulate su¢ cient capital to drive down the price
all the way to  (which is the partial equilibrium result highlighted in Stole and Zwiebel, 1996a).
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librium. Indeed, externalities from matching may be so important that equilibrium investment falls
below the e¢ cient level. Second, an explicit formulation of trading frictions helps to clarify the
e¤ects of specicity. In the basic model, specicity comes in two di¤erent forms: as a venture cost
 > 0 that prevents some of the capital suppliers from being matched; and as a deadweight loss
(1   ) > 0 in case a capital unit remains unmatched or negotiations break down. The following
proposition summarizes the e¤ects of these two sources of specicity on allocations.
Proposition 6. Venture costs  have a negative e¤ect on steady state capital stocks, while dead-
weight losses (1  ) have an ambiguous e¤ect on steady state capital stocks.
PROOF: Appendix B.
An increase in  implies a larger average posting cost per new unit of matched capital. The
e¤ect is the same than a larger investment adjustment cost in classical models: rms embark on
fewer ventures, which results in a lower steady state capital stock. A larger deadweight loss (1  ),
on the one hand, lowers the outside option of the capital supplier and thus, the price of capital. As
a result, rms post more new ventures, which has a positive e¤ect on steady state capital stocks.
On the other hand, a larger (1   ) reduces the incentives of capital suppliers to participate in
the market, which has a negative e¤ect on steady state capital stocks. The overall e¤ect is thus
ambiguous.
4.3 Robustness to alternative modeling assumptions
Aside from contract incompleteness and ex-post specicity, the basic model embodies a number
of important assumptions about production and the characteristics of capital suppliers. These
assumptions are made to keep the analysis tractable, and the model comparable with the neoclassical
benchmark.17 Yet, it is legitimate to ask to what extent the overinvestment result is robust to
alternative, more realistic assumptions.
Consider production rst. In the basic model, capital is a perfectly divisible and homogenous
input to production. In reality, capital projects are often indivisible and heterogenous. Stole
17Note that in the neoclassical benchmark, rms rent rather than purchase capital. It is straightforward to show
that overinvestment and ine¢ ciency in general equilibrium occur in much the same way when rms rent matched
capital, and rental rates rates are renegotiated on a period-per-period basis. Analytical details are available upon
request.
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and Zwiebel (1996a) derive their overhiring result in a discretized environment and thus, factor
indivisibilities per se are not a problem. Stole and Zwiebel also demonstrate that their results
generalize elegantly to a setup with heterogenous inputs as long as the di¤erent inputs remain
substitutes of each other and each supplier has the same degree of bargaining power. Heterogeneity
becomes more di¢ cult to analyze when the bargaining power across suppliers varies. Cahuc, Marque
and Wasmer (2007) provide a generalized treatment of these issues in a labor search model. Their
analysis shows that the overhiring result of the homogenous worker case can be misleading. In
particular, if a rm can substitute a worker group with higher bargaining power for other worker
groups with less bargaining power, the optimal strategy for the rm is to underemploy the latter
groups. A similar result would naturally emerge here. In all of this, it remains true, however, that
strategic bargaining on part of the rm leads to overinvestment in some capital goods as long as
there is at least some substitutability in the production function.18
Second, consider the characteristics of capital suppliers. In the basic model, suppliers are atom-
istic agents that need to pre-produce their capital goods and, once they match with a rm, do not
cooperate with other suppliers in the bargaining. In reality, capital suppliers are often large entities
who negotiate as a single party with the rm before actually sinking resources to produce capital.19
To analyze the robustness of the overinvestment result to such an alternative market structure, I
consider a simple static model with the following characteristics: (i) rms produce with two types
of imperfectly substitutable capital goods k1 and k2 using technology f(k1; k2) that is concave in
both arguments; (ii) each of the capital goods is produced by an independent supplier at some
convex cost c(ki); (iii) the market for k1 is perfectly competitive with price 1 while the market for
k2 is decentralized with the rm and the supplier simultaneously negotiating over k2 and 2 using
generalized Nash bargaining; (iv) investment is sequential in the sense that the rm acquires k1 in
a rst stage before it enters the market for k2 in a second stage.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) embody the idea that capital goods are heterogenous and supplied
by large entities. Assumption (iii) introduces switching costs for k2; i.e. due to some unspecied
18If all di¤erent capital goods are complements of each other, then there is a trade-o¤ between overinvestment
(lowering the marginal productivity of a given capital good) and underinvestment (lowering the marginal productivity
of the other complementary capital goods). The outcome of this trade-o¤ depends on the relative bargaining powers
of the di¤erent suppliers and the specics of the production function. Section 5 analyzes such a situation in a general
model where capital and labor are complements.
19As discussed in footnote 14, the absence of cooperation among suppliers is by itself not important because
resulting bargaining solution is equivalent to the Shapley values of a corresponding cooperative game.
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trading friction, rms cannot replace their supplier for k2 with another one and vice versa, a supplier
of k2 cannot sell its goods to another rm. As opposed to the basic model, however, capital suppliers
do not need to sink resources ex-ante but produce capital only at the time the price is determined.
Finally, the sequentiality assumption in (iv) provides the source of holdups. If the rm was able
to invest simultaneously in both k1 and k2, there would be no sense in which rents from ex-ante
investments are shared ex-post and thus, there would be no holdups. With sequentiality, by contrast,
the rms ex-ante investment in k1 in the rst stage a¤ects the rent in the second stage and thus
the bargained values of k2 and 2. This bargaining necessarily occurs ex-post because at the time
of the investment in k1, the rm does not know yet its trading partner for k2.
The e¢ cient allocation in this model is straightforward: the marginal productivity of each
capital good equals its marginal cost of production; i.e. @f=@ki = @c=@ki for both i = 1; 2. Given
the characteristics of f(; ) and c(), the two conditions dene a unique e¢ cient equilibrium (kS1 ; kS2 ):
In the decentralized world, the rms problem in the rst stage is
max
k1
[f(k1; k2)  1k1   2k2]
and the demand of k1 is given by
1 =
@f(k1; k2)
@k1
  @2
@k1
k2   2
@k2
@k1
. (20)
The price of k1, in turn, is given by 1 = @c=@k1 by assumption of perfect competition in this market.
The two additional terms in the rms capital demand describe the rms strategic behavior with
respect to the holdup problem in the second stage. Similar to the baseline model with atomistic
suppliers, the rm realizes that accumulating more k1 in the rst stage will impact the marginal
productivity of k2 and thus the bargaining in the second stage. By assumption (iii), the Nash
bargaining in the second stage takes the form maxk2;2 J
1 W 2 , where  is the bargaining power
of the second-stage capital supplier; J = [f(k1; k2)   1k1   2k2] is the value of the rm; and
W2 = 2k2   c(k2) is the value of the second-stage capital supplier. The solution to this problem
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is20
@f(k1; k2)
@k2
=
@c(k2)
@k2
(21)
2 = 

f(k1; k2)  1k1
k2

+ (1  )c(k2)
k2
. (22)
As long as @2f=(@k1@k2) 6= 0 (i.e. some substitution between k1 and k2 is possible), k2 and 2 are
both functions of k1 and thus, the rm has a strategic motive in the rst investment stage. Its
implications are described by the following proposition.
Proposition 7. There is a unique decentralized equilibrium (kB1 ; k
B
2 ) that solves (20)-(22). As long
as fk1k2 6= 0, this equilibrium is always ine¢ cient; with kB1 > kS1 i¤ @2f=(@k1@k2) < 0, and kB1 < kS1
i¤ @2f=(@k1@k2) > 0.
PROOF: Appendix B.
Despite the di¤erence in assumptions, the overinvestment result here is very similar to the
overinvestment result in the baseline model with atomistic suppliers. As long as k1 and k2 are
substitutes (i.e. @2f=(@k1@k2) < 0), the rm nds it optimal to overinvest in k1 so as to reduce the
marginal productivity of k2 and, in turn, the price of capital 2 in the second stage. The result is
an ine¢ ciently high k1 and thus overinvestment.
The model here is certainly very stylized and could be expanded along di¤erent dimensions.21
The point is simply to show that neither the assumption of atomistic suppliers nor the assumption
of ex-ante commitment of resources by suppliers is crucial for the overinvestment result. Instead,
and to sum up the discussion of this section, the crucial requirements behind the overinvestment
result of this paper are:
1. sequentiality of investment decisions, preventing binding ex-ante contracts;
2. specicity of capital giving rise to decentralized bargaining;
20The same solution could have been obtained alternatively by rst maximizing the joint surplus J +W2 with
respect to k2 and then splitting the surplus by maximizing the Nash product with respect to 2. Hence, the solution
is privately e¢ cient.
21Most importantly, the model could be set in a dynamic context where rms sequentially invest in a number of
di¤erent capital goods, with the price of each one of them being negotiated in a decentralized market.
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3. substitutability across di¤erent capital inputs.
None of these assumptions seem particularly stringent compared to the assumptions usually
made in the holdup literature.
5 Overinvestment and holdups in the labor market
In this section, I assess how holdup problems in physical capital markets interact with specicity
and contracting problems in the labor market that typically lead to underinvestment. To do so, I
incorporate the capital matching environment into a neoclassical framework where the labor market
is also subject to random matching. The labor market friction is modeled as in the standard setup
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), with the exception that rms are large and can hire multiple
workers. Hence, in the absence of binding ex-ante contracts, the same strategic considerations with
respect to holdup problems apply in the labor market than in the capital market, the consequences
of which have been analyzed previously by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b), Smith (1999) and Cahuc,
Marque and Wasmer (2007).
5.1 Environment
The model is populated by a large number of identical, innitely-lived rms and households. Firms
produce output y with matched capital k and hired labor n using a constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy f(k; n) that is concave in both arguments and satises the usual Inada conditions. Households
are composed of a continuum of workers and capital suppliers who discount the future at rate
 = (1 + r) 1.22 Workers are either employed or unemployed and have logarithmic preferences for
some general consumption good c.23 The wage rate when employed is w and the ow value from
non-market activity by the unemployed is b. Capital suppliers do not consume. For tractability,
I assume as in the basic model that these suppliers are atomistic entities that do not cooperate
once they are matched with a rm. Also, the spatial and technological constraints behind frictional
matching make it impossible for an unmatched capital supplier to move its capital unit to another
22For simplicity, I abstract from a distinct sector for capital allocation. Dropping this assumption is straightforward
but would unnecessarily complicate the model.
23As will become clear, none of the analytical results are a¤ected by the degree of risk aversion.
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matched supplier from the same household. Households, nally, pool all revenues from workers and
capital suppliers and allocate resources across consumption and investment in new capital units.
As is well known from the macro literature on indivisible labor (e.g. Rogerson, 1988; or Hansen,
1985), optimal risk sharing under separable consumption preferences implies that every worker of
the household consumes the same amount, disregarding of its employment history. The household
therefore acts as a state-contingent insurance mechanism for its workers, and the environment can
be analyzed as a standard representative agents model.24
The capital matching friction is the same than in the basic model. The only di¤erence here is a
slight change in notation to accommodate the relevant labor market variables. In particular, let vk
be the number of ventures posted per rm, and k the ow cost per posting. Then,m(vk; l) describes
the random matching process as a function of aggregate ventures vk and aggregate liquid capital
l. In turn, p(k) = m(vk; l)=vk and q(k) = m(vk; l)=l denote the respective matching probabilities,
with k = vk=l measuring the capital market tightness. Matched capital joins the rms existing
capital stock for production in the next period. After production, a fraction  is lost to depreciation.
In addition, a fraction sk of the remaining capital stock separates thereafter and is sold back to the
household at price 0  '  1 per unit. The deadweight loss 1   ' is another source of specicity
in the model.25 Unmatched capital units, in turn, remain idle and return on the matching market
in the next period, after incurring the same deadweight loss (1  ) than in the basic model. Given
these assumptions, the representative rms capital stock k evolves as
k+1 = (1  sk)(1  )k + p(k)vk. (23)
Likewise, unmatched capital per rm evolves as
uk;+1 = (1  q(k))l. (24)
On the labor market side, rms need to open job vacancies vn at cost n to search for available
24Most of the general equilibrium labor literature adopts the same approach. See Andolfatto (1996), Alexopoulos
(2004), or Gertler and Trigari (2008) for a few of many examples.
25The resale price ' is assumed exogenous here. One could easily endogenize this price to reect that capital sup-
pliers are willing to pay a higher price when the rematching probability is high. All the results in this sections would
remain valid, with the exception that endogenizing ' a¤ects the matching externality and thus Hosioscondition.
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workers. Available workers are made up of unemployed workers from the previous period plus
newly separated workers.26 Let 1   n denote the number of unemployed workers in the beginning
of the period (with total workers normalized to one), and snn the number of newly separated
workers. Then 1  n+ snn denes the number of available workers, and matching occurs according
to some constant-returns-to-scale function m(vn; 1   n + snn), with vn denoting aggregate job
vacancies. Furthermore, dene n = vn=(1   n + snn) as labor market tightness. Then p(n) =
m(vn; 1   n + snn)=vn and q(n) = m(vn; 1   n + snn)=(1   n + snn) denote the probabilities of
lling and nding a vacant job, respectively.27 Once matched, workers enter production the next
period. After production has taken place, workers separate at rate sn and return, as just described,
immediately into the labor market for rematching. Given these assumptions, the representative
rms employment n evolves according to
n+1 = (1  sn)n+ p(n)vn. (25)
5.2 E¢ cient allocation
The constrained-e¢ cient allocation for the representative agent solves the Bellman equation
O(k; uk; n) = max
c;l;k;vk;vn
[log c+ O(k+1; uk;+1; n+1)]
subject to the economys resource constraint f(k; n)+b(1 n)+(1 )sk'k+uk  kvk+nvn+c+l;
the capital accumulation constraint k+1 = (1  )(1  sk)k +m(vk; l); the evolution of unmatched
capital uk;+1 = l m(vk; l); and the evolution of employment n+1 = (1  sn)n+m(vn; 1 n+ snn).
Since the social planner takes into account the matching externality, the optimization problem is
formulated directly over aggregates l = l, vk = vk, k = k, vn = vn, n = n. As in the basic model, the
analysis focuses exclusively on steady states where x = x+1 for all involved variables. The following
proposition characterizes the e¢ cient equilibrium allocation.
26The assumption that separated workers can reenter the labor market in the same period contrasts with the
standard Mortensen-Pissarides setup, where separated workers reenter only the following period and thus spend at
least one period in unemployment. I make this assumption here such that the model under zero matching frictions
implies zero unemployment. Also see Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) who make the same assumption.
27To avoid excessive notation, matching in both the capital and the labor market is described by m(; ), even
though the functional form or parametrization is not necessarily the same. Hence, the probability measures p() and
q() may di¤er between the two markets.
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Proposition 8. There is a unique e¢ cient equilibrium, characterized by the solution (kS; Sk ; n
S; Sn)
to the following conditions
k = mvk

@f(k; n)=@k + (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)   

(26)
1   = ml

@f(k; n)=@k + (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)   

(27)
n = mvn

@f(k; n)=@n  b
1  [1  sn  mun(1  sn)]

(28)
n =
q(n)
sn + (1  sn)q(n) (29)
PROOF: Appendix B.
The rst two equations are equivalent to the e¢ ciency conditions for ventures and liquid capital
in the basic model; i.e. conditions (3) and (4). Together, they pin down the capital market
equilibrium, which is now dened by e¢ cient capital market tightness Sk and an e¢ cient capital
labor ratio (k=n)S. The third equation says that the cost of an additional job vacancy equals the
marginal increase in labor market matches times the discounted surplus from an additional match.
Together with the Beveridge curve in (29), which is simply the steady state version of the evolution
of employment (25), this determines the e¢ cient labor market tightness Sn and, in turn, the e¢ cient
levels of employment nS and capital kS.
5.3 Decentralized equilibrium with ex-post bargaining
As in the basic model, the decentralized economy is characterized by a complete absence of contract
enforcement. At any time before production starts, rms can renegotiate the price of capital with
their suppliers. Likewise, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b), wages of all workers (incumbents
and newly matched) are renegotiated in the beginning of every period. Since both capital and
labor are specic (due to the matching friction), this creates a double holdup problem. Similar
to the basic model, the assumed bargaining protocol implies a renegotiation-proof price of capital
and a renegotation-proof wage rate that solves the generalized Nash bargaining problem over the
respective surplus. These solutions depend on the outside options of the di¤erent parties. Since
capital suppliers and workers are atomistic and do not collaborate in the ex-post bargaining, they
28
consider the price of capital, respectively the wage rate as exogenous. The rm, on the other hand,
realizes that its outside option is to produce with one less unit of capital or labor, respectively. In
the eyes of the rm, the price of capital and the wage rate therefore depend on capital and labor
productivity, which are both functions of k and n.
The representative household enters the period with i newly matched units of capital, uk un-
matched units, and n employed workers. All of the 1   n unemployed and snn freshly separated
workers participate in the labor market. The household thus has to decide on optimal consumption
c and the mass of new suppliers it wants to send out into the capital market with liquid capital l.
The Bellman equation of this problem is
V (i; uk; n) = max
c;l
[log c+ V (i+1; uk;+1; n+1)]
+ [wn+ b(1  n) + i+ uk + d  c  l]
s.t. i+1 = q(k)l
uk;+1 = (1  q(k))l
n+1 = (1  sn)n+ np(n)(1  n+ snn)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier on the households budget constraint; and d are dividends from
a perfectly diversied portfolio of rm ownership. The solution to this problem implies, after some
rearrangement, the following steady state conditions (see Appendix B for details on all derivations
in this section)
1   = q(k) [  ] . (30)
@V
@n
=
[w  R]
1  (1  sn) . (31)
Except for the discount factor , condition (30) is identical to (6) and the free-entry condition
We = 0 of the basic model. Condition (31), in turn, says that marginal value of employment equals
the annuity value of wages net of the workers reservation wage R  b+(1  sn)q(n) @V=@n , which
is dened as the ow benets from unemployment, b, and the expected net value from employment
in the next period.
On the rms side, the optimal problem remains very similar to the basic model, only that now,
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the rm also chooses new job vacancies vn. The Bellman equation describing this problem is
J(k; k 1; n) = max
vk;vn
24 f(k; n)  (k; n)[k   (1  )(1  sk)k 1] + sk(1  )'k
 w(k; n)n  kvk   nvn + J(k+1; k; n+1)
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s.t. k+1 = (1  )(1  sk)k + p(k)vk
n+1 = (1  sn)n+ p(n)vn.
The notation  = (k; n) and w = w(k; n) captures the fact that, as discussed above, the rm
considers both the price of capital and the wage rate as functions of its capital stock and employment.
The solution to the rms problem yields, after some rearrangement, the following steady state
expressions for capital demand and labor demand, respectively,
(k; n) =
@f(k;n)
@k
  @
@k
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w@k n+ (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)  
k
p(k)
(32)
w(k; n) =
@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w
@n
n  n(r + sn)
p(n)
. (33)
The terms @=@k and @w=@k in (32) embody the rms strategic motive with respect to capital
accumulation; i.e. the rm realizes that an additional unit of capital a¤ects negotiations with all
newly matched suppliers as well as with all workers. The terms @=@n and @w=@n in (33) capture
the same strategic motive with respect to hiring. This makes clear that the holdup problem in the
capital market not only has an e¤ect on the rms investment decision, but also contaminates the
rms hiring margin. Vice versa, the holdup problem in the labor market a¤ects both the hiring
and the investment decision of the rm.
The model is closed with the renegotiation-proof capital price and wage rate that, as discussed,
emerge from the generalized Nash bargaining problem over the respective match surplus. The
capital price solves k
@J
@k+1
= (1 k)
h
@V
@i
  @V
@uk
i
= and the wage rate solves n
@J
@n
= (1 n)@V@n =,
where k and n denote the bargaining power of the capital supplier and the worker, respectively.
After some rearrangement, this yields equations for the price of capital and the wage rate that are
30
convex combinations of the respective partiesoutside option
(k; n) = k
"
@f(k;n)
@k
  @
@k
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w@k n+ (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)
#
+ (1  k). (34)
w(k; n) = n

@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w
@n
n

+ (1  n)R. (35)
The two equations form a system of non-homogenous linear di¤erential equations of  and w in
k and n. Solving this system is non-trivial, but it turns out that one can adapt the spherical
coordinate techniques used by Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2007) to derive a unique solution. In
particular, dene ~k = k=[1   (1   )(1   sk)], ~ = 1   (1   )(1   sk) and kn = 1 
~~k
~~k
n
1 n ,
nk = 1=kn =
1 n
n
~~k
1 ~~k
. Then, the solutions for (k; n) and w(k; n) are
(k; n) =
Z 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k
f1(kz; nz
kn)
~
dz + ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k)
w(k; n) =
Z 1
0
z
1 n
n f2(kz
nk ; nz)dz + (1  n)R,
where, for notational simplicity, f1(kz; nzkn) = @f(kz; nzkn)=@(kz) and f2(kznk ; nz) = @f(kznk ; nz)=@(nz).
As in the basic model, the price of capital is a weighted average of infra-marginal productivities with
respect to capital over the relevant range ~k (in case of no investment) to k (actual investment).
Similarly, the wage rate is a weighted average of infra-marginal productivities with respect to labor
(since wages for all employees, incumbent and new, are renegotiated in every period, the relevant
range extends from 0 to n). Using these expressions, capital demand in (32) and the capital price
in (34) can be expressed as
(k; n) = OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  k
p(k)
(36)
(k; n) = k

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~

+ (1  k), (37)
with the overinvestment factorbeing dened as
OI = 1 
~k
R 1
~
z
1
~~k
f11(kz;nz
kn )
~
dz + n
R 1
0
z
1 n
n

1+
~~k
1 ~~k

f12(kz
nk ;nz)
~
dz
@f(k;n)=@k
~
:
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Likewise, labor demand in (33) and the wage rate in (35) become
w(k; n) = OE  @f(k; n)=@n  n(r + sn)
p(n)
(38)
w(k; n) = n [OE  @f(k; n)=@n] + (1  n)R, (39)
with the overemployment factorbeing dened as
OE = 1 
~k
R 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k

1+
n
1 n

f12(kz; nz
kn)dz + n
R 1
0
z
1
n f22(kz
nk ; nz)dz
@f(k; n)=@n
:
Consider the overinvestment factor OI. As in the basic model, decreasing marginal productivity
of capital (i.e. f11 < 0) pushes rms to overinvest in order to reduce the holdup problem in the
capital market. At the same time, the rm also needs to take into account that capital a¤ects the
marginal productivity of labor and thus the holdup problem in the labor market. If capital and
labor are substitutes (i.e. f12 < 0), a larger capital stock also lowers the marginal productivity
of labor and thus reinforces the overinvestment tendency. If, by contrast, capital and labor are
complements (i.e. f12 > 0), then the rm faces a trade-o¤ because a larger capital stock worsens
the holdup problem in the labor market. In this case, holdup problems in the labor market reduce
the overinvestment motive of the rm and, depending on the details of technology and the bargaining
power of suppliers relative to workers, may even result in underinvestment. A similar analysis applies
for the overemployment factor OE. The following proposition summarizes these consequences.
Proposition 9. If capital and labor are substitutes and f(k; n) is strictly concave in both arguments
over some segment of [(1   )k; k] and [0; n], respectively, the two holdup problems lead to both
overinvestment and overemployment. If capital and labor are complements, the two holdup problems
counteract each other, reducing the tendency to both overinvest and overemploy.
The proposition o¤ers a cautionary tale that holdup problems in the labor market do not nec-
essarily lead to underinvestment, as is typically emphasized in the literature (e.g. Grout, 1984;
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). While a more detailed analysis with di¤erent types of labor and
capital is beyond the scope of this paper, this seems to be especially relevant for capital goods that
substitute for types of labor with strong bargaining power (e.g. relatively low-skilled but highly
unionized labor). Furthermore, the proposition illustrates that multiple holdup problems do not
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need to exacerbate each other as is often the case in the literature (e.g. Aruoba, Waller and Wright,
2008). Rather, if the factors subject to holdup problems are complementary for allocations, then
the decentralized economy may be relatively close to e¢ ciency even if each holdup problem on its
own severely distorts allocations.
Finally, the decentralized equilibrium can be computed by combining (30) and (36) with (37)
to eliminate the price of capital; and (38) with (39) to eliminate the wage rate. The following
proposition describes this equilibrium.
Proposition 10. There exists a unique decentralized bargaining equilibrium (kB; Bk ; n
B; Bn ) that
solves
k = p(k)(1  k)

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  

(40)
1   = q(k)k

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  

(41)
n = p(n)(1  n)

OE  @f(k; n)=@n  b
1  [1  sn   nq(n)(1  sn)]

(42)
n =
q(n)
sn + (1  sn)q(n) (43)
This equilibrium is generally ine¢ cient.
PROOF: Appendix B.
The system of equations in (40)-(43) di¤ers from their e¢ cient counterpart in (26)-(29) in two
respects: the presence of the overinvestment and overemployment due to the double holdup problem;
and the di¤erence in how the respective surpluses are split due to the matching externalities. In
particular, recall that mvk = p(k) (1  (k)), ml = q(k)(k) and mvn = p(n) (1  (n)). Hence,
Hosios (1990) condition is satised in the capital market and the labor market if and only if
k = (
S
k ) and n = (
S
n), respectively. But in this case, it is still generally true that the holdup
problems do not cancel each other out and thus, OI 6= 1 and OE 6= 1.28
28As long as capital and labor are complements, there may exist knife-edge cases where the bargaining powers
satisfy Hosioscondition in each market and, simultaneously, the two holdup problems cancel each other out. The
decentralized economy thus attains e¢ ciency. It is straightforward to show that the Cobb-Douglas production
function contains such a knife-edge case.
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6 Conclusion
The paper shows that two characteristics of physical capital ex-post specicity of capital goods
and sequentiality of investment decisions  can lead to a potentially important holdup problem
that has previously been neglected in the literature. Under the assumption that di¤erent capital
inputs are substitutes, this holdup problem leads to overinvestment in partial equilibrium. This
result contrasts with much of the literature. The di¤erence is due to particular assumptions about
agents and markets, thus highlighting the crucial role of microeconomic structure for the analysis
of holdup problems.29
In general equilibrium, overinvestment interacts with the trading frictions behind specicity as
well as other holdup problems in factor markets. An application in a general equilibrium macro
context with holdups in both physical capital and labor markets shows that the resulting allocations
are generally ine¢ cient. Whether the overinvestment result prevails in such a general equilibrium
setting and what the welfare losses from these frictions are remain quantitative questions that exceed
the scope of this paper.30 Yet, the policy implications of overinvestment are clearly important.
In particular, overinvestment provides a rationale for capital income taxation or, at the least,
counteracts other forces that, on their own, imply underinvestment and capital income subsidies
(e.g. Aruoba and Chugh, 2008).31
Overinvestment due to holdup problems may also help explain a number of empirical phenomena.
On a macroeconomic level, Caballero and Hammour (1998b) argue that worsening holdups of labor
on capital and factor substitutability provide an explanation for the sustained increase of the capital-
labor ratio in di¤erent European countries from the 1970s through the 1990s. The analysis in
Section 5 suggests that overinvestment due to holdup problems in capital markets amplies these
e¤ects. On a microeconomic level, holdup problems in physical capital markets may explain why
29De Meza and Lockwood (2004, 2007) explore alternative mechanisms due to coordination failure and heterogene-
ity across agents that imply overinvestment as a result of holdup problems. Other examples outside of the holdup
literature that, under some conditions, generate overinvestment are Chien and Lee (2008) or Lagos and Rocheteau
(2008a).
30Preliminary calculations in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy suggest that the welfare losses can easily
exceed 2-3% in consumption equivalents. The importance of these losses should not be surprising as distortions of
intertemporal margins usually have large e¤ects. See for example Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2008) for results of
similar size.
31Arseneau, Chugh and Kurmann (2008) show that quasi-rents arising from trading frictions in physical capital
markets may, on their own, provide a motive for capital income taxation.
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we observe suppliers for large capital expenditure projects enter into a consortium that negotiates
as a single party with the rm. By doing so, the suppliers can eliminate the rms strategic
incentive to overinvest that arises from pairwise negotiation within a time period. On a more
general level, specicity and holdup problems in physical capital markets may o¤er new interesting
insights about rm dynamics. In an environment with entry, strategic investment motives could
provide an alternative explanation for why rms grow gradually and in particular, why rm growth
decreases with size. Finally, the idea that capital allocation is subject to trading frictions that
vary with the degree of specicity of capital goods may help explain persistent di¤erences in rm
investment behavior and nancial performance across industries.
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A Derivations for the basic model
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The social planners problem is
O(k; u) = max
v;l
[f(k) + u  v   l +O(k+1; u+1)]
s:t: k+1 = (1  )k +m(v; l)
u+1 = l  m(v; l).
The rst-order conditions (expressed in steady state) are
 = mv [Ok  Ou] (44)
1 = mlOk + (1 ml)Ou (45)
and the corresponding envelope conditions are
Ou =  (46)
Ok = f
0(k) + (1  )Ok. (47)
Using the envelope conditions to substitute out for the marginal values in equations (44) and (45) yields
 = mv

f 0(k)

  

(48)
1   = ml

f 0(k)

  

. (49)
These two equations are (3) and (4) in the main text. To compute the equilibrium, combine the two
equations to substitute out the expression in brackets. This yields

1   =
mv
ml
.
But since mv = (1  ())p() and ml = ()q() = ()p(), this expression can be rewritten as
S =
1  

1  ()
()
. (50)
Under the conditions imposed on the matching function, () is monotonically increasing in  with
lim!0 () = 0 and lim!1 () = 1. Hence, there exists a unique e¢ cient steady state capital market
tightness S = [0;1]. In turn, the equilibrium capital stock kS is determined by (44), which can be
rewritten as
f 0(k)

=

mv
+ .
Given the properties of the production function, the left-hand side is a monotonically decreasing in k with
limk!0 f 0(k)= = 1 and limk!1 f 0(k)= = 0. Concurrently, the right-hand side is a monotonically
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increasing function of  with lim!0


mv
+ 

=  +  and lim!1


mv
+ 

= 1 by the regularity
conditions imposed on the matching function. Hence, (44) denes a schedule for (; k) that starts at
k = f 0 1 (=mv + ) > 0 for  = 0 and then decreases monotonically to k = 0 as  ! 1. Together
with (50), this schedule implies a unique equilibrium kS 2 [0; f 0 1(=mv + )], as illustrated in Figure
1 of the main text.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
To derive the equilibrium equations of the decentralized model with Nash bargaining, combine the optimal
entry condition for the capital supplier (6) with the free-entry condition. In steady state, this yields
1   = q() (  ) . (51)
On the rm side, combine (7) with (8) to obtain, in steady state,
 = p()

f 0(k)  0(k)k

  (k)

. (52)
This expression can be rearranged to obtain the capital demand equation (10) in the main text
(k) =
f 0(k)  0(k)k

  
p()
. (53)
Next, use the generalized Nash bargaining solution @J=@k = (1   )(Wk  Wu) and combine it with
the appropriate marginal values to obtain the price of capital


f 0(k)  0(k)k

  (k)

= (1  )((k)  )
, (k) = 

f 0(k)  0(k)k


+ (1  ). (54)
This is a non-homogenous linear di¤erential equation of  in k. Using standard tools from di¤erential
calculus, the solution for the homogenous part of this equation, h(k) =  [f 0(k)=   0(k)k], is
h(k) = k 
1

Z k
(1 )k
z
1 

f 0(z)

dz +D

.
The relevant support of integration in this expression is [(1   )k; k] because in every period, the rms
possible range of investments extends from 0 (no investment in which case the capital stock would reduce
to (1   )k) to k (the actual investment such that the capital stock remains at k). D is the constant
of integration. Under the assumption that lim!(1 )k[   (1   )k]() = 0; this constant needs to be
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D = 0.32 Hence, equation (54) becomes
(k) = k 
1

Z k
(1 )k
z
1 

f 0(z)

dz + (1  ),
which is equation (11) in the main text. One can rewrite k 
1

R k
(1 )k z
1 

f 0(z)

dz =
R 1
0
z
1 

f 0(kz)

dz. This,
in turn, implies 0(k)k = k
R 1
(1 )k z
1 
 z f
00(kz)

dz = k 
1

R k
(1 )k z
1

f 00(z)

dz. Hence, capital demand in (53)
and the price of capital in (54) can be expressed as
(k) = OI  f
0(k)

  
p()
(55)
(k) = 

OI  f
0(k)


+ (1  ), (56)
with OI 
"
1  k
  1

R k
(1 )k z
1
 f 00(z)dz
f 0(k)
#
denoting the overinvestment factor. For f 00()  0 with strict
inequality over some segment of ((1   )k; k), the integral in the denition of OI is negative and thus
OI > 1. Hence, for a given price of capital, the rm accumulates more capital than is warranted by the
marginal productivity f 0(k); i.e. the rm overinvests. This proves Proposition 2.
To compare the decentralized equilibrium to the e¢ cient allocation, take the capital demand equation
in (55) and the capital supply equation in (51) and use the solution for the price of capital to obtain,
respectively

p()
= (1  )

OI  f
0(k)

  

(57)
1  
q()
= 

OI  f
0(k)

  

. (58)
These are equations (13) and (14) in the main text. Combining the two equations to eliminate the bracketed
expression yields the equilibrium condition for 
B =
1  

1  

. (59)
Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium value B 2 [0;1]. Furthermore, rearrange (57) as OI  f 0(k)

=
1
1 

p()
+ . The above properties of 0(k)k imply that the left-hand side is a monotonically decreas-
ing function of k with limk!0OI  f 0(k)= = 1 and limk!1OI  f 0(k)= = 0. Concurrently,
the right-hand side is a monotonically increasing function of  with lim!0

1
1 

p()
+ 

= 
1  + 
and lim!1

1
1 

p()
+ 

= 1. Hence, the expression denes a schedule for (; k) that starts at
k = f 0 1


1 

p()
+
OI

> 0 for  = 0 and then decreases monotonically to k = 0 as  ! 1. Together
32See Appendix B of Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2007) for a more rigorous description of the conditions
under which the solution to that di¤erential equation is well dened.
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with (59), this schedule implies that there exists a unique equilibrium capital stock kB.
To prove the second part of Proposition 3, note that B = S if and only if  = (S). In that case,
Hosioss condition is satised and there is no externality from matching. A comparison of (48) with (57)
shows that at this point kB > kS because OI  f 0(k) > f 0(k) for any given k. This proves that the
decentralized equilibrium is never e¢ cient. Now, consider the case  > (S). This implies B < S and
thus p(B) > p(S). Hence, the decentralized solution f
0(k)

=

1
1 

p(B)
+ 

=OI may be smaller or
larger than the e¢ cient solution f
0(k)

=


mv
+ 

=

1
1 (S)

p(S)
+ 

, which means that kB Q kS
depending on which e¤ect prevails. For the opposite case  < (S), we have B > S and thus, a similar
analysis applies. In general, kB < kS if the externality from the matching friction is su¢ ciently large to
overwhelm the overinvestment e¤ect. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The rms problem is
J(k; k 1) = max
v;
[f(k)  [k   (1  )k 1]  v + J(k+1; k)]
s:t: k+1 = (1  )k + p()v
s:t: 1   = q()(  )
The rst-order condition with respect to v and the associated envelope condition for k are identical to
the ones in the Nash-bargaining case in (7) and (8). Together, they dene the optimal venture posting
condition
 = p()

f 0(k)

  

(60)
Simultaneously, the rm sets the posted price such as to maximize the value of optimal venture postings
in (60) subject to the suppliersqueuing condition. The rst-order condition is
0 = p0()
@
@

f 0(k)

  

  p()
To nd @=@, compute the partial derivative of (16) with respect to  and rearrange
@
@
=   q()
q0()(  ) .
Using this equations to substitute out @=@ from the above condition for optimal  yields
p()q0()(  ) =  p0()q()

f 0(k)

  

,
or equivalently
 = ()
f 0(k)

+ (1  ()),
where I used the fact that q0()=q() = 1   () and  p0()=p() = (). Plugging this solution into
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(16) and (60) to eliminate  yields, respectively
1   = q()()

f 0(k)

  

 = p()(1  ())

f 0(k)

  

.
Dividing the two equations to eliminate the bracketed expression then implies a unique equilibrium capital
market tightness P 2 [0;1]
P =
1  

1  ()
()
.
The optimal venture posting condition in (60) then implies the equilibrium capital stock
f 0(k)

=

p()(1  ()) + .
Since p()(1 ()) = mv, this equilibrium is equivalent to the social planner equilibrium, thus establishing
e¢ ciency. This proves Proposition 4.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
This part analyzes the limiting case where posting costs  are reduced to 0. Consider rst the e¢ cient
allocation. Condition (48) implies that mv = 0 for  = 0 for arbitrary match surpluses. But by the
regularity conditions of the matching function, mv = 0 implies  = 1; i.e. when venture costs are zero,
the planner naturally posts an innity of ventures. This, in turn, means that ml = 1 and thus, (49)
becomes 1   = [f 0(k)=   ], or equivalently
1 = f 0(k) + 1  . (61)
For the decentralized equilibrium, (59) implies that  is nite and that  = 1 for  = 0. By
the regularity conditions of the matching function, we thus have p() = 0 and q() = 1. Hence, (51)
implies  = 1. Furthermore, since p() exhibits decreasing returns to scale in  by denition of the
matching function, =p() ! 0 as  ! 0. But then, the capital demand in (55) implies that  = 1 =
OI  f 0(k)=, or equivalently
1 = OI  f 0(k) + 1  .
As long as OI > 1, we thus have kB > kS , which implies that the decentralized equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
This proves Proposition 5.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider rst a change in . By (59), an increase in  decreases equilibrium capital market tightness B
proportionally such that B is constant. Then, use (57) to rewrite it as
OI  f
0(k)

=
1
1  

p()
+  =
1
1  

q()
+ :
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The right-hand side is increasing in  since  is constant and q() is decreasing in . The left-hand side
is decreasing in k. Hence, an increase in  implies a decrease in k.
Now, consider a change in . By (59), an increase in  also decreases equilibrium capital market
tightness B. However, by (57), the e¤ect on k is ambiguous because an increase in  both increases the
right-hand side (directly through ) and decreases it (through the accompanying increase in p()). This
proves Proposition 6.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
To derive the decentralized equilibrium, the model is solved backwards. In the second stage, k1 is taken
as given and the rst-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem maxk2;2 J
1 W 2 are
(1  )W2 = J
(1  )W2[fk2   2] =  J [2   ck2 ].
Combining the two conditions yields
@f
@k2
=
@c(k2)
@k2
.
Using the implicit function theorem, it is possible to derive that
@k2
@k1
=   @
2f=(@k1@k2)
@2f=(@k2@k2)  @2c=(@k1@k2) .
Since @2f=(@k2@k2)  0 and @2c=(@k1@k2)  0 by assumption of the model, @k2=@k1 < 0 i¤@2f=(@k1@k2) <
0 (i.e. k1 and k2 are substitutes) and @k2=@k1 > 0 i¤ @2f=(@k1@k2) > 0 (i.e. k1 and k2 are complements).
Next, using the denitions of J andW in the main text, the rst condition above yields an explicit solution
for 2
2 = 
f(k1; k2)  1k1
k2
+ (1  )c(k2)
k2
,
which implies that
@2
@k1
k2 = 

@f
@k1
  1

+ 

@f
@k2
  f(k1; k2)  1k1
k2

@k2
@k1
+(1  )

ck2  
c(k2)
k2

@k2
@k1
.
In the rst stage, the demand for k1 is given by
1 =
@f
@k1
 

@2
@k1
k2 + 2
@k2
@k1

.
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Using the derivations from the second stage, the expression in brackets is
@2
@k1
k2 + 2
@k2
@k1
= 

@f
@k1
  1

+ 

@f
@k2
  f(k1; k2)  1k1
k2

@k2
@k1
+(1  )

@c(k2)
@k2
  c(k2)
k2

@k2
@k1
+


f(k1; k2)  1k1
k2
+ (1  )c(k2)
k2

@k2
@k1
.
or equivalently,
(1  )

@2
@k1
k2 + 2
@k2
@k1

=


@f
@k2
+ (1  )@c(k2)
@k2

@k2
@k1
.
This implies that @2
@k1
k2 + 2
@k2
@k1
7 0 and thus @c(k1)
@k1
= 1 ? @f@k1 i¤ @k2=@k1 7 0: From the derivations in
the second stage, we know that @k2=@k1 < 0 if @2f=(@k1@k2) < 0, in which case kB1 > k
S
1 (overinvest-
ment). Vice versa, @k2=@k1 > 0 if @2f=(@k1@k2) > 0, in which case kB1 < k
S
1 (underinvestment). This
proves Proposition 7.
B Derivations of model with holdups in labor market
B.1 Proof of Proposition 8
The social planners problem is
O(k; uk; n) = max
c;l;k;vk;vn
[log c+ O(k+1; uk;+1; n+1)]
+  [f(k; n) + b(1  n) + (1  )sk'k + uk   kvk   nvn   c  l]
s.t. k+1 = (1  )(1  sk)k +m(vk; l)
uk;+1 = l  m(vk; l)
n+1 = (1  sn)n+m(vn; 1  n+ snn).
In steady state, the rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are
1
c
= 


ml
@O
@k
+ (1 ml) @O
@uk

= 
mvk

@O
@k
  @O
@uk

= k
mvn
@O
@n
= n
and the corresponding envelope conditions are
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@O
@uk
= 
@O
@k
= 

@f
@k
+ (1  )sk'

+ (1  )(1  sk)@O
@k
@O
@n
= 

@f
@n
  b

+ [1  sn  mun(1  sn)]
@O
@n
.
Combining the second and third rst-order conditions with the corresponding envelope conditions yields
two conditions describing liquid capital supply and capital demand
1   = ml

fk + (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)   

(62)
k = mvk

fk + (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)   

(63)
Note that the opportunity cost of capital  drops out of these equations and thus, the form of consumption
preferences does not directly inuence capital allocation. On the labor market side, combining the last
rst-order condition with the last envelope condition yields
@f
@n
  b = n
1  (n)

r + sn
p(n)
+ (1  sn)(n)n

(64)
where 1   (n) = @m(vn; 1   n + snn)=@vn  vn=m(vn; 1   n + snn) = mvn=p(n), and (n) =
@m(vn; 1  n+ snn)=@(1  n+ snn) (1  n+ snn)=m(vn; 1  n+ snn) = mun=q(n).
To derive the equilibrium, divide (62) by (63) to obtain
Sk =
1  
k
1  (k)
(k)
. (65)
where 1   (k) = @m(vk; uk)=@vk  vk=m(vk; uk) = mvk=p(k) and (k) = @m(vk; uk)=@uk 
uk=m(vk; uk) = muk=q(k). Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium 
S
k 2 [0;1]. Equation (63), in
turn, can be reexpressed as
@f
@k
=
r +  + sk(1  )
1 + r
   (1  )sk'+ k
1  (k)
r +  + sk(1  )
p(k)
.
This pins down the optimal capital-labor ratio (k=n)S since for any CRTS production function f(k; n),
its partial derivatives depend on k=n only. Given k=n, (64) yields the optimal labor market tightness Sn .
This, in turn, determines equilibrium employment nS by the steady state law of motion for employment
nS =
q(n)
sn + (1  sn)q(n) ,
and thus the optimal matched capital stock kS . This completes the proof of Proposition 8.
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B.2 Proof of Propositions 9 and 10
The representative households problem is
V (i; uk; n) = max
c;l
log c+ V (i+1; uk;+1; n+1)
+ [wn+ b(1  n) + i+ uk + d  c  l]
s.t.i+1 = q(k)l
uk;+1 = (1  q(k))l
n+1 = (1  sn)n+ q(n)(1  n+ snn)
where d are rm prots transferred lump-sum to households. In steady state, the rst-order conditions of
the optimization problem are
1
c
= 
 = 

q(k)
@V
@i
+ (1  q(k)) @V
@uk

and the envelope conditions are
@V
@uk
= 
@V
@i
= 
@V
@n
= [w   b] + [1  sn   (1  sn)q(n)]@V
@n
Note that this last equation is the di¤erence in value from being employed relative to being unemployed.
Alternatively, one could have derived this envelope condition as is done in most of the labor search literature
by dening the value of employment as
E = w + [1  sn(1  q(n))]E + sn(1  q(n))U
and the value of unemployment as
U = b+ q(n)E + (1  q(n))U .
The di¤erence between the two values equals
E   U = (w   b) + [1  sn   (1  sn)q(n)](E   U),
which is equivalent to @V=@n above. In steady state, the envelope conditions for the capital side together
with the optimal choice for liquid capital yields
1   = q(k) [  ] . (66)
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The representative rms problem is
J(k; k 1; n) = max
vk;vn

f(k; n)  (k; n)[k   (1  )(1  sk)k 1] + sk(1  )'k
 w(k; n)n  kvk   nvn + J(k+1; k; n+1)

s.t. k+1 = (1  )(1  sk)k + p(k)vk
n+1 = (1  sn)n+ p(n)vn.
In steady state, the rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are
k = p(k)
@J
@k+1
n = p(n)
@J
@n
and the envelope conditions are
@J
@k+1
=
@f(k; n)
@k
  @
@k
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   + (1  )(1  sk)
+sk(1  )'  @w
@k
n+ (1  )(1  sk) @J
@k+1
@J
@n
=
@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w
@n
n  w + (1  sn)@J
@n
Combining the rst-order conditions with the envelope conditions, we obtain, respectively, an expression
for capital demand and labor demand
 =
@f(k;n)
@k
  @
@k
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w@k n+ (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)  
k
p(k)
(67)
w =
@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w
@n
n  n(r + sn)
p(n)
. (68)
The price of capital is implied by the generalized Nash bargaining solution k
@J
@k+1
= (1 k)
h
@V
@i
  @V
@uk
i
=.
Using the above envelope conditions yields
 = k
"
@f(k;n)
@k
  @
@k
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w@k n+ (1  )sk'
1  (1  )(1  sk)
#
+ (1  k). (69)
Likewise, the wage rate is implied by the generalized Nash bargaining solution n
@J
@n
= (1  n)@V@n =. To
derive an explicit expression for w, it turns out to be convenient to express
Vn = E   U = w + [1  sn(1  q(n))]E + sn(1  q(n))U   U
= w + (1  sn)(E   U) + snq(n)(E   U) + U   U
=
(w  R)
1  (1  sn) .
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where R  r
1+r
U

  snq(n)
1+r
E U

denes the annuity value of being unemployed; i.e. the workers reservation
wage.33 Plugging this expression into the Nash bargaining solution yields
w = n

@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
[1  (1  )(1  sk)]k   @w
@n
n

+ (1  n)R. (70)
Together with (69), this equation forms a system of non-homogenous di¤erential equations of  and w in
k and n. To solve this system, I adapt the derivations laid out in Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2007) for
the heterogenous labor case. To simplify notation, start by rewriting (69) and (70) as
 = ~k

@f(k; n)
@k
  @
@k
~k   @w
@k
n

+ ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k)
w = n

@f(k; n)
@n
  @
@n
~k   @w
@n
n

+ (1  n)R,
with ~k = k=[1  (1  )(1  sk)] and ~ = 1  (1  )(1  sk). Taking the partial derivatives of the
two equations with respect to n and k, respectively, yields
@
@n
= ~k

@2f(k; n)
@k@n
  @
2
@k@n
~k   @
2w
@k@n
n  @w
@k

@w
@k
= n

@2f(k; n)
@k@n
  @
2
@n@k
~k   @
@n
~   @
2w
@k@n
n

.
After some rearrangement, the two expressions imply that
@
@n
1  ~~k
~k
=
@w
@k
1  n
n
.
Dening kn =
1 ~~k
~~k
n
1 n and nk = 1=kn =
1 n
n
~~k
1 ~~k
, (69) and (70) can thus be reexpressed as
 = ~~k

1
~
@f(k; n)
@k
  @
@k
k   @
@n
knn

+ ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k)
w = n

@f(k; n)
@n
  @w
@k
nkk  
@w
@n
n

+ (1  n)R.
Consider the weighted sums of partial derivatives @
@k
k + @
@n
knn and
@w
@k
nkk +
@w
@n
n in these expressions.
To advance further, introduce auxiliary variables ~n and ~k such that
@(k; n)
@n
knn =
@~(k; ~n)
@~n
~n and
@w(k; n)
@k
nkk =
@w(~k; n)
@~k
~k ,
with ~(k; ~n) = (k; n) and @w(~k; n) = w(k; n). Furthermore, dene transformed production functions
33Note that in the standard formulation of the labor search model, where separated workers cannot
immediately rematch, this reservation wage reduces to R = r1+rU , which may look more familiar.
49
f(k; n) = g(k; ~n) = h(~k; n). With these auxiliary variables at hand, one can express, respectively
@
@k
k +
@
@n
knn =
@~(k; ~n)
@k
k +
@~(k; ~n)
@~n
~n
@w
@k
nkk +
@w
@n
n =
@w(~k; n)
@~k
~k +
@w(~k; n)
@n
n.
These expressions can be rewritten in the polar coordinate system. Specically, let k = r sin  and
~n = r cos , with r and  denoting the radial and angular coordinates, respectively. Then
@~(k; ~n)
@k
k +
@~(k; ~n)
@~n
~n = r
@~(r; )
@r
and thus, the price of capital in (69) can be expressed in the polar coordinate system as
~(r; ) = ~~k

g1(r; )
~
  r@~(r; )
@r

+ ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k),
where, for notational simplicity, g1(r; ) = @g(k(r; ); ~n(r; ))=@k. This is an independent di¤erential
equations of ~ in r that can be solved in similar fashion than the di¤erential equation of the basic model.
The solution is
~(r; ) =
Z 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k
g1(rz; )
~
dz + r
  1~~kD()

+ ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k).
The relevant support for the integration derives from the fact that the rms per-period capital stock
ranges from (1  (1  )(1  sk))k = ~k = ~r sin  (in case of no investment) to k = r sin  (the actual
investment). Under the assumption that lim!~k(  ~k)(k; n)! 0, it must be the case that D() is
identical to zero. Translating this solution back into the carthesian system in k and ~n, we thus have
~(k; ~n) =
Z 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k
g1(kz; ~nz)
~
dz + ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k).
A similar transformation yields a solution for the wage rate in (70)
~w(~k; n) =
Z 1
0
z
1 n
n h2(~kz; nz)dz + (1  n)R,
where h2(~kz; nz) = @h2(~kz; nz)=@(nz). Finally, to determine ~n and ~k, note that by denition
@(k;n)
@n
=
@~(k;~n)
@~n
@~n
@n
and @w(k;n)
@k
= @w(
~k;n)
@~k
@~k
@k
. Hence @~n
@n
knn = ~n and
@~k
@k
nkk = ~k. These are two di¤erential
equations with solution ~n = n1=kn = nnk and ~k = k1=nk = kkn .34 The price of capital and the wage
34There are, of course, many other solutions. But we need only one solution and this is presumably the
easiest one.
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rate become, therefore,
(k; n) =
Z 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k
f1(kz; nz
kn)
~
dz + ~k(1  )sk'+ (1  k)
w(k; n) =
Z 1
0
z
1 n
n f2(kz
nk ; nz)dz + (1  n)R,
where f1(kz; nzkn) = @f(kz; nzkn)=@(kz) and f2(kz
nk ; nz) = @f(kznk ; nz)=@(nz).
The solutions for the price of capital and the wage rate imply @
@k
k = k
R 1
~
z
1
~~k
f11(kz;nz
kn )
~
dz and
@w
@k
n = n
R 1
0
z
1 n
n

1+
~~k
1 ~~k

f12(kz
nk ;nz)
~
dz. Hence, capital demand in (67) and the price of capital in (69)
can be expressed as
(k; n) = OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  k
p(k)
(71)
(k; n) = k

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~

+ (1  k), (72)
with the overinvestment factor being dened as
OI = 1 
~k
R 1
~
z
1
~~k
f11(kz;nz
kn )
~
dz + n
R 1
0
z
1 n
n

1+
~~k
1 ~~k

f12(kz
nk ;nz)
~
dz
@f(k;n)=@k
~
:
Likewise, labor demand in (68) and the wage rate in (70) become
w(k; n) = OE  @f(k; n)
@n
  n(r + sn)
p(n)
(73)
w(k; n) = n

OE  @f(k; n)
@n

+ (1  n)R, (74)
with the overemployment factor being dened as
OE = 1 
~k
R 1
~
z
1 ~~k
~~k

1+
n
1 n

f12(kz; nz
kn)dz + n
R 1
0
z
1
n f22(kz
nk ; nz)dz
@f(k; n)=@n
:
To derive the decentralized equilibrium, combine the optimal capital supply in (66) and the capital
demand equation in (71), respectively, with the price of capital in (72)
1   = q(k)k

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  

(75)
k = p(k)(1  k)

OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
+
(1  )sk'
~
  

(76)
Dividing the two equations to eliminate the match surplus in brackets yields the unique decentralized
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steady state solution for k 2 [0;1]
Bk =
1  
k
1  k
k
.
Given Bk , the equilibrium capital-labor ratio (k=n)
B is pinned down by (76), rewritten as
OI  @f(k; n)=@k
~
=

r +  + sk(1  )
1 + r
   sk(1  )'

+
k
1  k
[r +  + sk(1  )]
p(k)
.
In turn, the equilibrium in the labor market is computed by combining the labor demand equation in (73)
with the wage equation in (74)
(1  n) [OE  @f(k; n)=@n R] =
n(r + sn)
p(n)
.
The reservation wage R  r
1+r
U

  snq(n)
1+r
E U

can be made explicit by using the value of unemployment
r
1+r
U

= b+ q(n)
E U

, the generalized Nash bargaining solution n
@J
@n
= (1  n)E U and the optimal
vacancy posting condition n = p(n)
@J
@n
R = b+
n
1  n
nn(1  sn).
Hence, the above combination of labor demand and wage setting equation becomes
OE  @f(k; n)=@n = b+ n
1  n

(r + sn)
p(n)
+ nn(1  sn)

.
This equation pins down the equilibrium labor market tightness Bn , provided that OEfn(k; n)   b > 0.
Finally, the Beveridge curve pins down equilibrium employment
nB =
q(n)
sn + (1  sn)q(n) ;
which, in turn, determines kB. This completes the proof of Proposition 9 and 10.
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